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Foreword 
Over the years IIASA has played an important role in developing methods 
for improving decision making concerning the acid rain problem. IIASA's 
RAINS model is accepted as a basis for negotiations between countries with 
regard to the abatement of acid rain. As a decision problem, the abatement 
of acid rain is typically a problem with several criteria, for example, the 
amounts of money spent by the different countries to diminish emissions 
and the target levels for the depositions. This paper proposes an interactive 
approach for finding reasonable deposition levels for all countries involved 
by a limited transfer of funds between those countries. 
The basis for this work was laid when the authors participated in IIASA's 
Young Scientist Summer Program. The work is a result of cooperation be-
tween the Transboundary Air Pollution Project and the Methodology Deci-
sion Analysis Project. 
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Abstract: In this paper, the acid rain problem in Europe is discussed, stressing the transboundary 
tradeoffs between abatement costs of sulphur emission reduction and corresponding deposition levels in 
the different countries. An interactive decision support methodology is proposed which utilizes a 
powerful nonlinear multicriteria software package to evaluate various scenarios and tradeoffs. This 
methodology provides a more appropriate tool for policy making than single-objective minimization of 
costs with given target deposition levels, because in the latter the tradeoffs cannot be analyzed directly. 
The results from a tradeoff analysis using previously published data suggest that reasonable deposition 
levels can be reached with limited transfers of funds between countries. The extent of these transfers can 
be controlled by selecting appropriate target levels for the criteria across countries. 
Keywords: Multicriteria decision making, nonlinear optimization, environmental analysis, international 
policy making 
1. Introduction 
Nowadays, acid rain is one of the major envi-
ronmental concerns in Europe. Yet, as many other 
problems, the problem of acid rain is not new. 
Over 300 years ago, the English nobleman John 
Evelyn presented an essay titled "Fugifugium or 
the Inconvenience of the Aer and Smoake of 
London Dissipated, together with some Reme-
dies Humbly Proposed", to King Charles II 
(Evelyn, 1661). Evelyn already suggested the the-
ory that sulphur originating from smoke caused 
by burning coal turns silver black and destroys 
iron and stone. In the following centuries the 
awareness of this problem has grown, and more 
and more has been done to avoid the negative 
impacts of pollution, especially at the local and 
regional level. Recently it has been established 
that both sulphur dioxide (S0 2 ) and nitrogen 
oxide (NOx) emissions contribute to the forming 
of acid rain. 
Over the last few decades the scale of environ-
mental problems has shifted dramatically from 
the local and regional level to a continental (acid 
rain) and global (greenhouse effect) level. The 
primary reason for this shift is the fact that the 
problem has now become transboundary, in that 
emissions in one country affect the environmental 
quality in other countries, and at the same time 
the environmental quality in a given country is 
affected by emissions in other countries. 
In this paper the focus is on acid rain in 
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Europe, and more specifically on the transbound-
ary problem of tradeoffs between and balancing 
of costs and benefits of abatement policies across 
countries in Europe. The costs of emission reduc-
tion consist of the expenses associated with abat-
ing air pollution originating from S02 and NOx . 
Power plants, oil refineries and other industries, 
as well as transportation and the domestic sector 
are to a large extent responsible for these emis-
sions. The benefits of abatement measures in-
clude decreased damage to materials, buildings 
and ecosystems, particularly forests and aquatic 
systems, as well as human health. 
For several reasons it is difficult to balance 
costs and benefits of emission reduction . The first 
reason is that costs and benefits may not accrue 
to the same country, so that the acid rain prob-
Table 1 
Relevant information on the 27 European countries •.b 
Coun try name Abbreviation Current Maximum 
emissions reduction 
(1000 tons) (%) 
e; m ; 
Albania ALB 25 78 
Austria AUS 147 77 
Belgium BEL 306 67 
Bulgaria BUL 500 83 
Czechoslovakia CZE 1625 75 
Denmark DEN 151 86 
Finland FIN 180 85 
France FRA 1015 76 
German Dem. Rep. GDR 1300 80 
Fed. Rep. Germany FRG 1375 86 
Greece GRE 352 86 
Hungary HUN 825 77 
Ireland IRE 70 82 
Italy !TA 1900 84 
Luxembourg LUX 14 90 
Netherlands NET 170 87 
Norway NOR 50 73 
Poland POL 2050 63 
Portugal POR 79 89 
Romania ROM 100 83 
Spain SPA 1638 82 
Sweden SWE 165 76 
Switzerland SWI 43 55 
Turkey TUR 483 62 
Soviet Union USS 6000 76 
United Kingdom UNK 1845 81 
Yugoslavia YUG 588 79 
' Adapted from Klaassen and Jansen (1989), and Maeler (1989). 
!em calls for international environmental policies 
and negotiations in order to determine how much 
each country should abate and how much each 
country should pay for abatement in other coun-
tries. The second reason complicating the analy-
sis is that benefits cannot easily be expressed in 
terms of monetary figures, so that preferably a 
comparison of costs and benefits would involve 
direct tradeoffs in relevant physical units. 
The purpose of our paper is to gain insight in 
the decision dynamics of this complicated prob-
lem by exploring the nature of tradeoffs between 
the abatement costs incurred by each country and 
deposition levels throughout Europe. In order to 
analyze this issue we utilize a simplified version 
of RAINS (Regional Acidification Information 
and Simulation) (Alcamo et al., 1987), an inte-
1980 GNP Surface Cost coefficients 
(10 6 US$) (1000 km 2 ) Linear Quadratic 
C; S; Cl; /3; 
NA' 29 1.25 0.026 
70640 84 l.00 0.02 
109640 31 2.00 0.0095 
37390 111 1.40 0.0021 
89260 128 1.00 0.000283 
61520 43 1.80 0.0054 
46360 337 1.00 0.0175 
601560 547 2.00 0.0054 
120940 108 1.00 0.0005 
758480 249 2.00 0.00056 
39910 132 0.831 0.0 
20650 93 0.60 0.000389 
16300 70 1.25 0.01 
359210 301 l.05 0.0006 
5400 3 7.00 0.6 
155 740 41 2.50 0.0076 
52410 324 l.75 0.14627 
139780 313 0.85 0.000849 
22430 92 1.35 0.006196 
50870 238 1.15 0.000543 
195670 505 0.50 0.000668 
114150 450 2.50 0.05927 
101440 41 2.00 0.07133 
61610 461 1.25 0.000555 
1212030 3364 1.30 0.000141 
467880 244 1.30 0.000193 
56660 256 l.25 0.000483 
b Iceland is excluded from the analysis, since its emissions and depositions do not affect and are not affected by any other 
European country. 
' The 1980 GNP of Albania is extrapolated to be 3430 million US$. 
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grated model which has been developed to link 
emissions and depositions in Europe, to provide 
the necessary data. For our purpose RAINS pro-
vides, on the one hand, estimates of the cost 
functions associated with abatement by each of 
the 27 European countries considered, and, on 
the other hand, the effects in terms of deposition 
levels for various different abatement policies by 
these countries. A list of the 27 countries can be 
found in the first column of Table 1. 
The information provided by RAINS can be 
used as input into an interactive multicriteria 
Decision Support System which serves to analyze 
the tradeoffs between various different policy 
scenarios, in terms of the cost and deposition 
levels for each country. In this system the effects 
of various different target levels for the deposi-
tion and abatement costs for each country can be 
explored in one single interactive computer ses-
sion. In this session, the decision maker modifies 
the target levels at each stage as deemed appro-
priate, after which the computer model calculates 
a new recommended solution based upon these 
modified values. 
Our approach differs from previous studies in 
that 1) benefits do not have to be expressed in 
terms of monetary units or utile values, 2) the 
abatement costs and depositions of each country 
can be considered separately, or alternatively 
groups of countries can be considered, 3) the 
analysis is interactive, so that various different 
scenarios and tradeoffs can be evaluated in a 
short period of time, and 4) the effects of limited 
transfers of funds between countries on emissions 
and depositions can easily be calculated. Such 
limited transfers are more reasonable in practice 
than transfers of large amounts of money. There-
fore, the contribution of this paper is that it 
provides a modeling framework in which the rele-
vant tradeoffs between depositions and abate-
ment costs for each of the 27 European countries 
can be analyzed interactively. Thus, the model 
can serve as a decision support tool in the process 
of establishing international environmental poli-
cies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. First, the background of the acid rain 
problem and the RAINS model are discussed, 
followed by a presentation of the formal model 
formulation and the multicriteria decision sup-
port method. Next, the method is illustrated by 
analyzing several scenarios and tradeoffs. Some 
extensions of our analysis and model formulation 
are suggested. The paper concludes with some 
final remarks. 
2. Background 
Recently, a growing body of literature on the 
policy aspects of acidification has developed 
(Watson, 1986). This research can be divided into 
several types. One approach is the multiattribute 
utility theory (MAUT) approach (Anandalingam. 
1987) which analyzes feasible policy alternatives 
by establishing preference (utility) functions using 
either exact or imprecise preference information. 
A second type focuses on the costs and effects of 
certain specific emission reduction scenarios. For 
instance, Shaw et al. (1988) compare a nonabate-
ment scenario (also called official energy sce-
nario) with, among others, a uniform 30% reduc-
tion scenario by 1993 at the latest, which scenario 
was considered in the S0 2 protocol of Helsinki 
1985 (Hettelingh and Hordijk, 1986, p. 39). Shaw 
(1988) calculates costs associated with a uniform 
50% emission reduction and shows how deposi-
tions could further be decreased by allocating the 
costs across countries in an optimal way in the 
sense that the total costs are minimized. This 
allocation of costs would involve a significant 
transfer of funds from Western European coun-
tries to Eastern European countries. Cesar and 
Klaassen (1990) estimate the deposition reduc-
tions and costs of the EC-directive (European 
Community, 1988) on large combustion plants. 
One drawback of the above studies is that no 
interactive mechanism is used to evaluate alter-
native deposition and abatement cost levels. This 
makes 'what-if' type analyses difficult, so that the 
tradeoffs between various scenarios cannot easily 
be evaluated. In addition, these papers often 
stress the advantages of coordinated international 
actions using major transfers of funds from West 
to East (Shaw, 1988). In reality, the scope of such 
transfers may be very limited. 
A third type of research emphasizes the wel-
fare economic analysis of acid rain abatement 
(Maeler, 1989; Van Ierland, 1989). The distin-
guishing characteristic of this research is that 
costs of emission reductions as well as benefits of 
the corresponding improvement of ecosystems, 
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materials and buildings are assessed in monetary 
terms. In particular for the benefits this is a 
cumbersome and controversial task, because the 
diversity of benefit components are difficult to 
express monetarily, and because monetary bene-
fits cannot easily be aggregated for all European 
countries. Maeler deals with this problem by as-
suming that marginal benefits are constant and 
that the cost functions and expenditures are 
known. Assuming rational governments, he as-
sesses the appropriate levels of costs and benefits 
by equating marginal costs and benefits. The as-
sumption of constant marginal benefits, however, 
is questionable. Van Ierland, on the other hand, 
uses an estimated piecewise linear benefit func-
tion for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). 
In order to simplify the problem, he subsequently 
assumes the shape and values of the benefit func-
tions for all other countries to be the same as for 
the FRG. It is obvious that an analysis in which 
deposition reductions are expressed in physical 
terms is preferred to the approach in the above 
studies where benefit functions are estimated in 
either monetary values or utile values. 
Another type of research focuses on policy 
implications, using either upper bounds or target 
values for the deposition levels in the various 
countries. Van lerland (1989) deals with the eco-
logically oriented critical loads approach. The 
critical load represents the highest level of acidi-
fication for which no major damage is done to the 
ecosystem in the long run. Looking at both sul-
phur and nitrogen, Van Ierland selects a critical 
load level of 1400 acid equivalents per hectare, 
which in the case of sulphur only would translate 
into slightly over 2 grams per square meter. 
Klaassen and Jansen (1989) build a model using 
the political target approach. Concentrating on 
sulphur only, they take a target load of between 1 
and 4 grams of sulphur per square meter. A 
target load can be interpreted as an attainable 
and politically acceptable load for the intermedi-
ate term, the ultimate goal of course being the 
achievement of the critical loads. Given these 
loads, the minimum costs and emission reduc-
tions needed to achieve these goals are calcu-
lated. As was the case with the previously men-
tioned type of research, however, a drawback of 
these studies is that there is neither an explicit 
balancing of the tradeoffs between abatement 
costs and the benefits of corresponding lower 
depositions across countries, nor a user-interac-
tive tradeoff analysis. 
This paper extends the above research by con-
centrating on an interactive abatement-deposi-
tion tradeoff analysis across 27 European coun-
tries. It is clear that such an analysis is of a 
multicriteria nature. The powerful and interactive 
nonlinear multicriteria optimization package 
IAC-DIDAS-N (Kreglewski et al., 1988), also 
known as DIDAS-N, is used to perform this 
analysis. The analysis is performed without mak-
ing the controversial step of monetarizing the 
benefits. Additionally, the advantages of coopera-
tive action are stressed because the tradeoff anal-
ysis clearly indicates which countries might trans-
fer limited amounts of funds to other countries. 
At the same time, by selecting reasonable ranges 
for the acceptable deposition levels and costs in 
the tradeoff analysis, the resulting solutions are 
such that none of the countries is assumed or 
required to pay unreasonable sums of money to 
other countries, or to pay unreasonable domestic 
abatement costs. In contrast to MAUT (Ananda-
lingam, 1987), our approach requires no a priori 
information from the policy makers in the form 
of a preference function, but explicitly and inter-
actively presents the various feasible abatement-
deposition tradeoffs to the policy makers for eval-
uation. 
3. The RAINS model 
RAINS is an integrated model of acidification 
in Europe which describes the set of relations 
that link the generation of pollutants with their 
depositions, and their adverse impacts on natural 
resources such as forests, groundwater and lakes. 
The emphasis of RAINS is on the transboundary 
aspects of air pollution (AJcamo et al., 1987). The 
model was developed at the International Insti-
tute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) as a 
tool for evaluating control strategies. Currently 
the model is primarily sulphur-based, but nitro-
gen is presently being included and ammonia 
emissions may be included in the near future . 
The parts of the model relevant for the pur-
pose of this paper are: Energy Pathway, S0 2 
Emissions, S02 Transport (including deposition), 
and S02 Control and Abatement costs. In the 
Energy Pathway and S0 2 Emissions Submodels, 
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different energy projections can be implemented. 
The submode! accounts for five emission-produc-
ing sectors: conversion (e.g., refineries), power 
plants, domestic, industrial and transportation. 
Eight fuel types are distinguished: brown coal, 
hard coal, derived coal (e.g., coke, brown coal 
briquettes), light oil (e.g., gasoline), medium des-
tillate (gas oil), heavy oil, gas and other fuels 
(Alcamo et al., 1987). The latter two are assumed 
to produce no sulphur emissions. Process emis-
sions are taken into account as well when calcu-
lating the total emissions. 
Energy conservation, fuel substitution, the use 
of lower-sulphur fuels and desulphurization are 
considered as means of emission reduction in the 
Pollution Control and Costs submodels of RAINS. 
Combustion modification, flue gas desulphuriza-
tion and regenerative processes are considered as 
feasible technologies for desulphurization. En-
ergy conservation is not yet included in the Costs 
submode! of RAINS. Costs are based on country-
and technology-specific parameters (Amann et 
al., 1987; Amman, 1988). The resulting cost coef-
ficients incorporate the most important factors 
influencing abatement costs of the European 
countries in an internationally comparable way. 
The cost functions are piecewise linear, reflecting 
that in order to reduce emissions further, another 
technique may have to be applied with higher 
marginal abatement costs. 
The Transport submode! divides Europe into 
about 700 150 x 150 kilometer grids, and predicts 
sulphur concentration and deposition due to S0 2 
emission patterns on each of these grids. In doing 
so, the submode! uses source-receptor linkages 
from the long-range atmospheric transport model 
developed by the Norwegian Meteorological In-
stitute under the European Monitoring and Eval-
uation Program (EMEP) of the Economic Coun-
cil of Europe (ECE) Convention on Transbound-
ary Air Pollution. These source-receptor linkages 
combined determine the pollution transportation 
matrix. 
In the following, a simplified and slightly mod-
ified version of RAINS due to Maeler (1989) is 
used. First, quadratic approximations are made of 
the stepwise linear cost functions of RAINS. Sec-
ond, an aggregated 27 x 27 transportation matrix, 
representing the sulphur transport between 27 
European countries, is used, rather than the 150 
x 150 kilometer grids in the full-blown RAINS 
model. An advantage of this aggregation is that 
the tradeoff analysis is more straightforward. A 
disadvantage, however, is that the deposition lev-
els in the aggregate model represent country-wide 
averages, so that the deposition effects on differ-
ent ecosystems within a country cannot be ana-
lyzed explicitly. The matrix used in our analysis 
differs slightly from that used by Maeler (see 
Stam et al. , 1989). For a more detailed discussion 
of the drawbacks of the simplified version the 
reader is referred to Maeler (1989). 
The output from the above submodels of 
RAINS serves as input for the decision support 
model in which the interactive tradeoff analysis is 
conducted. It is possible to evaluate multiple sce-
narios generated, using RAINS within the deci-
sion support framework. In Section 6, one such 
scenario based on Maeler (1989) is used. 
4. Model formulation 
To determine the tradeoffs between the depo-
sition levels and abatement costs for each coun-
try, the transboundary relationships between S02 
emission, S02 emission reduction, deposition and 
the associated abatement costs for each of the 27 
countries can formally be stated as a nonlinear 
multicriteria mathematical programming prob-
lem. All cost figures, emission data and deposi-
tion data in the remainder of this paper have 
been calculated on an annual basis. Denoting the 
surface of country i (in 1000 square kilometers) 
by s; and the deposition in country i (in 1000 
tons) by d;, the decision problem for country i is 
by how much it should reduce its emissions (r) in 
such a way that both domestic abatement costs 
c;(r) and depositions in tons per square kilome-
ter (or equivalently in grams per square meter) in 
country i (d;/s) are at an acceptable level. At 
the same time, depositions in country i are af-
fected by emission reductions in other countries. 
As, ceteris paribus, lower abatement costs and 
deposition levels are preferred to higher levels, 
the two criteria for country i are to minimize 
Z;1 = c;(r;) and Z;2 = d;/s;. Therefore, the aggre-
gate problem has a total of 27 * 2 = 54 separate 
criteria. Suppose we define the set of the 27 
European countries as S. Then the mathematical 
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formulation of the problem is as follows: 
Min 
Min 
s.t. 
for all i ES, 
z;2 = d;/s; for all i ES, 
d . = "a . * (e .- r.) for all iES, l 1-.J I} } } 
O~r; ~m; * e;/100 forall iES, 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
( 4) 
where A ={a;) is the 27 X 27 S0 2 transportation 
matrix between the different countries, such that 
a;1 is the deposition in country i as a proportion 
of S0 2 emissions in country j; e; represents the 
initial S02 emission by country i (in 1000 tons), 
i.e. the current emission level if a nonabatement 
strategy is adopted; and m ; represents the maxi-
mum technologically feasible emission reduction 
for country i as a precentage of e;. 
Maeler (1989, p. 14) indicates that the data on 
m; are based on information from IIASA. As 
mentioned before, following Maeler, quadratic 
abatement cost functions of the form c;(r) = a;r; 
+ f3 ;r;2 are used, where a; and {3 ; are scalar 
coefficients. The cost function estimates are based 
on the Energy Scenario 2000, and are expressed 
in million D-Mark. The emission and deposition 
data are based on 1984 energy consumption pat-
terns (Maeler, 1989, p. 14). The GNP and surface 
figures were borrowed from Klaassen and Jan sen 
(1989). The relevant numerical data for our illus-
tration, in Section 6, are summarized in Table 1. 
The S02 transportation matrix adapted from 
Maeler (1989) is not shown here but can be found 
in Stam et al. (1989). 
In addition to the above model restrictions in 
(3) and (4), we will use policy target levels which 
seek to limit the abatement costs c;(r) of country 
i to a specific percentage P; of the annual 1980 
GNP of country i, g;. The reference point method 
upon which the multicriteria decision support 
package DIDAS-N is based, is well-suited for 
utilizing such policy target levels in the form of 
aspiration levels and reservation levels for each of 
the criteria. The DIDAS-N methodology is pre-
sented next. 
5. Multicriteria methodology 
The nonlinear multicriteria system DIDAS-N 
3.2 (Kreglewski et al., 1988) can be run on an 
IBM/ PC/ XT/ AT or compatible computer, as is 
the case with the RAINS model. DIDAS-N uses 
a user-friendly spreadsheet format, and facilitates 
an interactive decision process wich is based on 
the reference point method (Wierzbicki, 1982; 
Lewandowski and Wierzbicki, 1988a, 1988b). The 
methodology underlying DIDAS-N uses the con-
cepts of satisficing solutions and bounded ratio-
nality (March and Simon, 1958), and has been 
shown to be consistent with the process of human 
decision making. The optimization module of DI-
DAS-N uses an order approximating achievement 
function with shifted penalties as the scalarizing 
function (Wierzbicki, 1982, 1986), and utilizes 
symbolic differentiation (Kreglewski et al ., 1988), 
so that the user does not need to specify the 
derivatives of the objective function . 
At each stage of the interactive process the 
decision maker can specify aspiration and reser-
vation levels for the criteria. The aspiration level 
of a criterion represents the level which the deci-
sion maker would like to achieve, if possible, and 
the reservation level is the worst level acceptable 
to the decision maker. The aspiration and reser-
vation levels are also called reference points. 
DIDAS-N uses these specified reference point 
values as the basis for solving a multicriteria 
optimization problem to find a Pareto-optimal or 
nondominated solution which reaches the aspira-
tion levels of the criteria as closely as possible, 
while satisfying the reservation levels for the cri-
teria, if possible. A solution is Pareto-optimal if 
none of the criteria can be improved without 
sacrificing at least one of the remaining criteria. 
A detailed discussion of the reference point 
method can be found in Wierzbicki (1982) or the 
user manual of DIDAS-N (Kreglewski et al., 
1988). For other more general overviews of multi-
criteria decision making techniques and concepts 
the interested reader is referred to Steuer (1986) 
and Yu (1985). 
At each iteration the solution which is calcu-
lated using the specified aspiration and reserva-
tion levels of the criteria is presented to the 
decision maker, who can subsequently modify 
these levels according to his/ her preferences and 
the information contained in the solution. In this 
way (s)he is able to interactively explore various 
tradeoffs between the criteria. For instance, if the 
decision maker wishes to improve the deposition 
level in a given country, (s)he can lower the 
aspiration or reservation level for this criterion 
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(or both), and within the ranges of all other 
criteria the model will attempt to find a solution 
which reaches the aspiration level as much as 
possible. At any point of the analysis the decision 
maker can inspect and evaluate the relevant deci-
sion variables on the screen. It is also possible to 
graphically display the tradeoffs between the cri-
teria in the form of bar graphs. 
Using the model formulation in (1)-(4), DI-
DAS-N first calculates the utopia and nadir val-
ues for the deposition and abatement cost criteria 
for each country. The utopia or selfish value of a 
criterion is its best possible value, ignoring all 
other criteria. Since the different criteria are 
conflicting, it is typically not possible to simulta-
neously attain the utopia values for all criteria. 
The nadir value of a criterion is defined by its 
worst possible value over the set of Pareto-opti-
mal solutions. It is very difficult to calculate the 
exact nadir values (Isermann and Steuer, 1987), 
so that DIDAS-N approximates them by the worst 
Table 2 
criteria values calculated during the analysis. The 
utopia and nadir values provide important infor-
mation to the decision maker, because they de-
fine the relevant range of criteria values which 
should be considered in the tradeoff analysis. For 
instance, if the utopia value for deposition in 
France equals 0.29 grams per square meter, then 
it is unreasonable - within the structure and 
underlying assumptions of the current model - to 
strive for deposition levels of less than 0.29 grams 
per square meter. An illustration of the method-
ology follows next. 
6. Illustration 
The utopia and nadir values for all 27 coun-
tries are given in Table 2. It is clear that the 
utopia value for abatement costs c;(r) equals 
zero for each country, because the lowest possible 
costs are associated with the nonabatement strat-
Utopia, nadir values, aspiration, reservation values for the initial (neutral) solution for the unrestricted model, all 27 countries 
Country Costs (million D-Mark) Depositions (grams / m2 ) 
Utopia Asp Solution Res Nadir Utopia Asp Solution Res Nadir 
ALB 0 9.8 14.8 19.7 34.3 0.09 0.22 0.29 0.35 0.50 
AUS 0 89.4 134.l 178.8 369.4 0.54 1.10 1.38 1.66 2.37 
BEL 0 223.0 334.4 445.9 809.2 1.00 1.86 2.28 2.71 3.79 
BUL 0 298.2 447.3 596.5 942.7 0.29 0.67 0.87 1.06 1.59 
CZE 0 471.7 707.6 943.5 1639.5 1.37 2.65 3.30 3.94 5.40 
DEN 0 89.4 134.1 178.8 324.9 0.22 0.58 0.76 0.94 1.40 
FIN 0 134.5 201.8 169.0 562.7 0.08 0.16 0.21 0.25 0.38 
FRA 0 1094.3 1641.5 2188.7 4756.1 0.29 0.57 0.71 0.85 1.22 
GDR 0 130.0 195.0 260.0 540.8 1.10 2.24 2.81 3.39 5.22 
FRG 0 207.6 311.4 415.2 783.7 0.57 1.23 1.55 1.88 3.01 
GRE 0 82.0 123.1 164.1 251.5 0.15 0.41 0.55 0.68 0.94 
HUN 0 159.9 239.8 319.7 538.2 0.86 1.78 2.23 2.69 3.71 
IRE 0 30.7 46.0 61.3 104.7 0.09 0.23 0.29 0.36 0.50 
!TA 0 958.7 1438.1 1917.4 3204.1 0.45 1.06 1.36 1.67 2.56 
LUX 0 53.0 79.5 106.0 183.5 0.07 0.24 0.32 0.41 0.65 
NET 0 139.1 208.7 278.2 536.0 0.53 1.28 1.66 2.03 2.99 
NOR 0 52.2 78.4 104.5 258.7 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.23 
POL 0 681.3 1022.0 1362.7 2515.4 1.17 1.93 2.31 2.69 3.72 
POR 0 36.9 55.3 73 .8 125.5 0.06 0.17 0.23 0.28 0.41 
ROM 0 25.l 37.7 50.2 99.2 0.27 0.53 0.67 0.80 1.09 
SPA 0 48.4 72.6 96.8 1876.3 0.20 0.48 0.62 0.76 1.12 
SWE 0 276.1 414.2 552.3 1245.5 0.11 0.20 0.24 0.29 0.42 
SWI 0 18.1 27.1 36.2 87.2 0.39 0.81 1.02 1.23 1.82 
TUR 0 132.6 198.8 265.1 424.2 0.15 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.43 
USS 0 3093.4 4640.1 6186.8 8859,9 0.22 0.42 0.51 0.61 0.92 
UNK 0 739.7 1109.5 1479.4 2373.0 0.44 1.03 1.33 1.62 2.28 
YUG 0 196.2 294.2 392.3 684.8 0.41 0.84 1.05 1.27 1.77 
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egy (r; = 0). On the other hand, the cost functions 
are convex, so that the nadir value for abatement 
costs (en is found by reducing domestic emis-
sions to the maximum technologically feasible 
extent, implying r; = m; * e; and thus cr(r) = 
c;(m; * e). For instance, the maximum emission 
reduction for Ireland is rmE = 0.82 * 70 = 57.4 
(see Table 1), so that its nadir cost value is 
c~e = 1.25 * 57.4 + O.Ql * (57.4)2 = 104.7 million 
D-Mark. Similarly, the nadir value for deposition 
in each country is associated with the status quo 
of nonabatement, while the utopia value is 
reached if each country reduces emissions maxi-
mally. Again taking Ireland as an example, the 
S0 2 transportation matrix (Maeler, 1989) shows 
that the deposition in Ireland consists of 24% of 
the emissions in Ireland plus one percent of the 
emissions in the United Kingdom, so that d 1RE = 
0.24 * e1RE + 0.01 * euNK· Nonabatement would 
imply dIRE = 0.24 * 70 + 0.01*1845 = 35.25, SO 
that the deposition in grams per square meter is 
given by dmE/siRE = (35 .25)/ 70 = 0.50, while the 
maximum abatement strategy would yield d 1RE 
/siRE = (0.24 • (1 - 0.82) * 70 + O.Ql * (1 - 0.81) 
* 1845)/70 = 0.09. These values can also be 
found in Table 2. This table also shows the initial 
' neutral ' solution and associated initial aspiration 
(Asp) and reservation (Res) levels which DIDAS-
N suggests for each of the criteria as a reasonable 
starting point for the interactive decision process. 
The neutral solution can be interpreted as a 
' middle-of-the-road' solution . 
Inspecting Table 2, throughout Europe abate-
ment costs are quite low compared to their nadir 
values. Most deposition levels are at a moderate 
level, with the exception of Belgium, Czechoslo-
vakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), 
Hungary and Poland. These countries have a 
deposition level of more than 2 grams per square 
meter. The deposition of 3.30 grams in 
Czechoslovakia is particularly high, considering 
that this level represents a country-wide average, 
so that certain parts of the country will have 
much higher pollution levels. The model in Table 
2 is called the ' unrestricted ' model, because no 
' hard' constraints are used to limit abatement 
costs and deposition levels. 
As a first step to achieve deposition and cost 
levels within reasonable margins, the reservation 
levels suggested in the initial solution were uni-
formly changed to 2 grams per square meter for 
deposition and to 0.4% of GNP for abatement 
costs. None of the aspiration levels were changed. 
The GNP figures in Table I are in US dollars, 
and the cost functions are expressed in D-Marks. 
For the purpose of our analysis, the GNP data 
were converted to D-Marks using a conversion 
rate of 2.5 D-Mark for 1 US dollar. Of course 
conversion rates fluctuate considerably, so that 
this rate is not exactly correct. In our paper the 
GNP data are only used for establishing reserva-
tion levels for abatement costs, so that a rough 
estimate of the conversion rate suffices. It is easy 
to repeat the analysis in our illustration using a 
different conversion rate, if this is desired. Since 
the reservation levels for all countries will be 
affected in the same proportion, the resulting 
solutions will likely be similar. 
Simply stated, the reservation level of 2 grams 
for the average deposition within each country 
can be viewed as a pollution load, above which 
the ecosystem would be badly disturbed. The 
purpose of selecting these reservation levels is to 
study how this deposition level in one country can 
be reached by additional emission reduction mea-
sures in another country, especially if this one 
country already has high abatement costs. Note 
that for some countries such as Albania a target 
load of 2 grams is higher than the nadir value, so 
that these countries will always have deposition 
levels which are better (lower) than the 2 gram 
target load . The modified solution presented by 
DIDAS-N after changing the reservation levels is 
given in Table 3. 
For several countries, the deposition and cost 
reservation levels cannot be met. In the case of 
Czechoslovakia, both the deposition and cost 
reservation levels are not met, but the nadir value 
for abatement costs is not yet reached, so the 
domestic depositions could be reduced further , 
albeit at great expense. Later we will address this 
issue in more detail. Countries such as Belgium, 
Hungary, the GDR and Poland, which had high 
deposition levels in the initial solution (see Table 
2) now have greatly reduced deposition levels, but 
in the case of Poland at a cost exceeding the 
target level of 0.4% of GNP. In Table 3, Hungary 
has a reduced deposition level in spite of slightly 
lower domestic emission reductions than in the 
initial solution in Table 2. This is due to the 
increased emission abatement activities in sur-
rounding countries. The reason why Hungary it-
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self does not spend additional funds on abate-
ment is that the current level in Table 3, 222.2 
million D-Mark, already exceeds its reservation 
level of 0.4% of GNP, 206.5 million D-Mark. 
Interestingly, a number of Western European 
countries (e.g., FRG, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Italy and the Netherlands) are at their nadir cost 
levels in Table 3, so that these countries are 
reducing their domestic emissions to the maxi-
mum feasible extent. The reason is that for these 
countries the 0.4% of GNP, used as the reserva-
tion level for abatement costs, far exceeds the 
nadir cost values. Thus, given the 0.4% reserva-
tion level it is reasonable to assume that these 
countries might be willing to transfer limited funds 
to other countries which have not yet reached 
their technological emission reduction limits, but 
have already exceeded their cost reservation lev-
els. 
As a further exercise, we divided Europe into 
Eastern Europe (the COMECON countries, Al-
Table 3 
bania, Turkey and Yugoslavia) and Western Eu-
rope (The European Community, the Nordic 
countries, Austria and Switzerland). The deposi-
tion reservation levels for the Eastern European 
countries were kept at 2 grams per square meter, 
but for the Western countries these levels were 
tightened to 1 gram. At the same time, in order 
to obtain more realistic results, the reservation 
levels for abatement costs were lowered from 
0.4% to 0.2% of GNP for Eastern Europe. The 
levels for the Western countries were kept at 
0.4%. The revised solution is given in Table 4. 
From this table we see that in four Eastern 
European countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland and Yugoslavia) and in Luxembourg the 
cost targets are not met, and in addition the 
deposition level of 2 grams is not reached in 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Comparing Tables 
3 and 4, we see that relaxing the reservation 
levels for abatement costs leads the Eastern Eu-
ropean countries to spend less money on emis-
Suggested solution with uniform reservation levels, unrestricted model 
Country Costs (million D-Mark) Depositions (grams/m 2 ) 
Aspiration Solution Reservation Aspiration Solution Reservation 
ALB 0 0.0 34.3 0.09 0.46 2.00 
AUS 0 369.4 706.4 0.54 0.74 2.00 
BEL 0 809.2 1096.4 1.00 1.20 2.00 
BUL 0 173.6 373.9 0.29 1.21 2.00 
CZE 0 1211.2 ' 892.6 1.37 2.17' 2.00 
DEN 0 324.9 615.2 0.22 0.24 2.00 
FIN 0 0.0 463.6 0.08 0.31 2.00 
FRA 0 4756.1 6015.6 0.29 0.40 2.00 
GDR 0 540.8 1209.4 1.10 1.29 2.00 
FRG 0 783.7 7584.8 0.57 0.67 2.00 
GRE 0 0.0 399.1 0.15 0.88 2.00 
HUN 0 222.2' 206.5 0.86 1.95 2.00 
IRE 0 0.0 163.0 0.09 0.38 2.00 
!TA 0 3204.1 3592.1 0.45 0.51 2.00 
LUX 0 0.0 54.0 0.07 0.65 2.00 
NET 0 536.0 1557.4 0.53 0.68 2.00 
NOR 0 0.7 524.1 0.06 0.11 2.00 
POL 0 1540.6' 1397.8 1.17 1.68 2.00 
POR 0 0.0 224.3 0.06 0.40 2.00 
ROM 0 99.2 508.7 0.27 0.50 2.00 
SPA 0 25.9 1956.7 0.20 1.03 2.00 
SWE 0 199.6 1141.5 0.11 0.20 2.00 
SW! 0 87.2 1014.4 0.39 0.39 2.00 
TUR 0 0.0 616.1 Q.15 0.41 2.00 
USS 0 3267.4 12120.3 0.22 0.56 2.00 
UNK 0 1305.3 4678.8 0.44 1.15 2.00 
YUG 0 554.8 566.6 0.41 0.68 2.00 
' The reservation level could not be attained for this country, using the current scenario. 
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sion reduction, and as a result depositions are 
generally higher in Table 4. On the other hand, 
many of the Western European countries were 
already spending relatively large amounts of 
money in the solution of Table 3, and spend even 
more in that of Table 4, in order to reach the 
tighter deposition reservation level of 1 gram per 
square meter. A good example of this increased 
effort is the case of Luxembourg, which spends 
little money under the 2-gram scenario, but 
spends 123.4 million D-Mark in the 1-gram sce-
nario. In fact, this additional expense is a sacri-
fice by Luxembourg to aid Belgium in reducing 
its deposition level from 1.20 in Table 4 to 1.0. 
Note that Belgium itself cannot spend more than 
it is already doing (809.2 million D-Mark). If such 
a sacrifice by Luxembourg is considered unrea-
sonable, the model can easily be modified to set a 
limit to the sacrifice by Luxembourg. In our illus-
tration this was not done. Alternatively, a limited 
Table 4 
transfer of money from Belgium to Luxembourg 
to compensate for the additional expense could 
be decided in international negotiations. 
It is of interest to see whether it is possible 
(feasible) to impose a ' hard' restriction (upper 
bound) of at most 2 grams per square meter on 
the deposition level in each country. Such a hard 
restriction differs from a reservation level in that 
reservation levels do not have to be reached at 
any price, but no feasible solution exists if a 
'hard' upper bound cannot be satisfied, and the 
mathematical program cannot be solved without 
relaxing some of these bounds. Table 5 gives the 
results from solving the revised model with uni-
form reservation levels of 2 grams for deposition 
and 0.4% of GNP for abatement costs. We call 
this the 'restricted' model because of the 'hard' 
constraints mentioned above. 
Due to imposing the upper bounds, the utopia 
values for the criteria in Table 5 are slightly 
Suggested solution with different reservation levels for Eastern and Western Europe, unrestricted model 
Country Costs (million D-Mark) Depositions (grams/m2) 
Aspiration Solution Reservation Aspiration Solution Reservation 
ALB 0 12.0 17.2 0.09 0.38 2.00 
AUS 0 369.4 706.4 0.54 0.85 1.00 
BEL 0 809.2 1096.4 1.00 1.00 1.00 
BUL 0 96.2 187.0 0.29 1.34 2.00 
CZE 0 917.0 a 446.3 1.37 2.67 a 2.00 
DEN 0 324.9 615.2 0.22 0.24 1.00 
FIN 0 0.0 463.6 0.08 0.31 1.00 
FRA 0 4756.1 6015.6 0.29 0.35 1.00 
GDR 0 540.8 604.7 1.10 1.34 2.00 
FRG 0 783.7 7584.8 0.57 0.65 1.00 
GRE 0 78.9 399. l 0.15 0.71 1.00 
HUN 0 164.3 a 103.3 0.86 2.27 a 2.00 
IRE 0 0.0 163.0 0.09 0.29 1.00 
!TA 0 3204.l 3592.1 0.45 0.52 1.00 
LUX 0 123.4 a 54.0 0.o? 0.20 1.00 
NET 0 536.0 1557.4 0.53 0.53 1.00 
NOR 0 0.0 524.1 0.06 0.09 1.00 
POL 0 1170.6 a 698.9 1.17 1.91 2.00 
POR 0 98.8 224.3 0.06 0.21 1.00 
ROM 0 99.2 254.4 0.27 0.58 2.00 
SPA 0 205.2 1956.7 0.20 0.87 1.00 
SWE 0 225.6 1141.5 0.11 0.19 1.00 
SW! 0 87.2 1014.4 0.39 0.39 1.00 
TUR 0 0.1 308.l 0.15 0.41 2.00 
USS 0 3259.0 6060.2 0.22 0.57 2.00 
UNK 0 2373.0 4678.8 0.44 0.45 1.00 
YUG 0 413.6 a 283.3 0.41 0.83 2.00 
• The reservation level could not be attained for this country, using the current scenario. 
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different from the previous tables. In particular, 
the lowest feasible abatement costs for Czecho-
slovakia, the GDR, Hungary and Poland are con-
siderable . As expected, all deposition levels in the 
solution of Table 5 are now at most 2 grams per 
square meter, and Czechoslovakia is the only 
country which is exactly at this upper bound. 
Note that the surrounding countries are forced to 
major expenditures in order to force the deposi-
tion level in Czechoslovakia down to 2 grams. 
Czechoslovakia itself, however, is not spending 
more in the restricted solution of Table 5 than in 
its unrestricted counterpart of Table 4, because it 
was already spending considerably in excess of its 
reservation level of 892.6 million D-Mark. Similar 
to the situation described above for Luxembourg 
in Table 4, if it is deemed appropriate for 
Czechoslovakia to spend more on reducing its 
domestic emission (or if other countries agree to 
provide it with external funds to do so), either its 
abatement cost reservation level can be increased 
Table 5 
or a 'hard' lower bound on its abatement expen-
ditures can be imposed. 
The restricted model with ' hard' upper bounds 
of 2 grams for depositions in each country was 
also re-solved using the scenario of Table 4 with 
different reservation levels for Eastern (2 grams, 
0.2% of GNP) and Western (1 gram, 0.4% of 
GNP) European countries. The results in Table 6 
show that two countries, Belgium and Czechoslo-
vakia, are exactly at the upper bound of their 
deposition level. Comparing Table 6 with Table 
4, we see that the deposition reduction from 2.67 
to 2.0 grams in Czechoslovakia is in part due to a 
considerable abatement increase by Poland. 
The above analyses show that a limited trans-
fer of money from a country spending less than a 
given target amount to a country spending more 
might be reasonable. The extent of such transfers 
can be controlled by manipulating the aspiration 
and reservation levels for the criteria. These lim-
ited transfers are different from the transfers 
Suggested solution with uniform reservation levels for all 27 European countries, restricted model 
Country Costs (million D-Mark) Depositions (grams/ m2 ) 
Aspiration Solution Reservation Aspiration Solution Reservation 
ALB 0 3.1 34.3 0.34 0.41 2.00 
AUS 0 369.4 706.4 0.69 0.74 2.00 
BEL 0 809.2 1096.4 1.04 1.18 2.00 
BUL 0 192.2 373.9 0.83 1.16 2.00 
CZE 1185.1 1185.1 a 892.6 l.63 2.00 2.00 
DEN 0 324.9 615.2 0.22 0.24 2.00 
FIN 0 92.5 463.6 0.24 0.24 2.00 
FRA 0 4502.9 6015.6 0.33 0.38 2.00 
GDR 210.3 540.8 1209.4 1.17 l.26 2.00 
FRG 0 783.7 7584.8 0.60 0.66 2.00 
GRE 0 79.0 399.1 0.61 0.67 2.00 
HUN 184.0 249.7 a 206.5 0.96 1.80 2.00 
IRE 0 2.1 163.0 0.15 0.36 2.00 
!TA 0 2556.7 3592.I 0.67 0.75 2.00 
LUX 0 9.0 54.0 O.D7 0.60 2.00 
NET 0 536.0 1557.4 0.56 0.66 2.00 
NOR 0 2.6 524.1 0.09 0.09 2.00 
POL 581.6 2515.4 a 1397.8 1.26 1.30 2.00 
POR 0 0.1 224.3 0.30 0.33 2.00 
ROM 0 99.2 508.7 0.34 0.45 2.00 
SPA 0 708.8 1956.7 0.60 0.61 2.00 
SWE 0 95.9 1141.5 0.13 0.19 2.00 
SW! 0 87.2 1014.4 0.48 0.50 2.00 
TUR 0 96.0 616.1 0.33 0.35 2.00 
USS 0 4607.5 12120.3 0.46 0.46 2.00 
UNK 0 1478.3 4678.8 0.47 1.03 2.00 
YUG 0 684.8 a 566.6 0.50 0.58 2.00 
a The reservation level could not be attained for this country, using the current scenario. 
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Table 6 
Suggested solution with different reservation levels for Eastern and Western Europe, restricted model 
Country Costs (million D-Mark) Depositions (grams/ m2 ) 
Aspiration Solution Reservation Aspiration Solution Reservation 
ALB 0 12.9 17.2 0.34 0.38 2.00 
AUS 0 369.4 706.4 0.69 0.69 I.DO 
BEL 83.5 809.2 1096.4 1.04 I.DO I.DO 
BUL 0 342.7 a 187.0 0.83 1.42 2.00 
CZE 1185.1 1207.1 a 446.3 1.63 2.00 2.00 
DEN 0 324.9 615.2 0.22 0.24 1.00 
FIN 0 34.3 463.6 0.24 0.27 I.DO 
FRA 0 4706.1 6015.6 0.33 0.32 I.DO 
ODR 210.3 540.8 604.7 1.17 1.21 2.00 
FRO 0 783.7 7584.8 0.60 0.60 I.DO 
ORE 0 87.8 399.1 0.61 0.68 I.DO 
HUN 184.0 195.1 a 103.3 0.96 1.97 2.00 
IRE 0 7.3 163.0 0.15 0.27 1.00 
!TA 0 3204.1 3592.1 0.67 0.48 I.DO 
LUX 0 9.8 54.0 0.07 0.59 1.00 
NET 0 536.0 1557.4 0.56 0.53 I.DO 
NOR 0 1.6 524.1 0.09 0.09 1.00 
POL 581.6 2515.4 a 698.9 1.26 1.28 2.00 
POR 0 16.5 224.3 0.30 0.30 1.00 
ROM 0 99.2 254.4 0.34 0.48 2.00 
SPA 0 689.6 1956.7 0.60 0.61 I.DO 
SWE 0 59.2 1141.5 0.13 0.20 I.OD 
SW! 0 87.2 1014.4 0.48 0.39 I.DO 
TUR 0 49.4 308.1 0.33 0.38 2.00 
USS 0 4578.0 6060.2 0.46 0.46 2.00 
UNK 0 2334.6 4678.8 0.47 0.47 1.00 
YUO 0 684.8 a 283.3 0.50 0.57 2.00 
' The reservation level could not be attained for this country, using the current scenario. 
proposed by Maeler (1989) and by Bergman et al. 
(1990), in that our solutions suggest only few 
countries (for instance, in the scenario of Table 6: 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and 
Yugoslavia) receive a payment and the amounts 
are much lower. The maximum transfer might be 
given by the difference between the reservation 
level and the actual solution value, e.g. Hungary 
might receive up to 91.8 million D-Mark. A draw-
back of our solutions is that abatements are not 
always done in the most cost-efficient way. On 
Table 7 
the other hand, the smaller transfers involved 
may render the solutions more realistic. 
As a last case we study the situation where 
Belgium and the Netherlands want to limit depo-
sitions to at most 1 gram. For the remaining 25 
countries, the aspiration and reservation levels 
suggested in the initial ' neutral' solution by DI-
DAS-N were used. The results for Belgium and 
the Netherlands from the initial ' neutral' solution 
for the unrestricted model in Table 2 are re-
peated in Table 7. In this solution, the deposition 
Neutral solution for Belgium and the Netherlands, unrestricted model 
Country 
BEL 
NET 
Costs (million D-Mark) 
Aspiration 
223.0 
139.1 
Solution 
334.4 
208.7 
Reservation 
445.9 
278.2 
Depositions (grams/m 2 ) 
Aspiration 
1.86 
1.28 
Solution 
2.28 
1.66 
Reservation 
2.71 
2.03 
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levels suggested by DIDAS-N for Belgium (2.28 
grams) and the Netherlands (1.66 grams) are 
rather high, and the abatement costs are much 
below both the nadir values and the reservation 
!eve! of 0.4% of GNP. Since in this section we 
want to focus on depositions, the aspiration and 
reservation levels for abatement costs were kept 
at the levels suggested by DIDAS-N in the initial 
solution. This implies that the aspiration levels 
for abatement costs will be impossible to attain , 
given our goal of lowering depositions. 
From Table 8 we see that in the scenario 
where the aspiration and reservation levels for 
depositions in the Netherlands are set equal to 1 
gram, both Belgium and the Netherlands spend 
more money on reducing emissions than in the 
'neutral' solution: 550.2 million D-Mark versus 
334.4 million for Belgium, and 391.4 million ver-
sus 208.7 million for the Netherlands. Both these 
cost figures are at a moderate level compared to 
their nadir values of 809.2 and 536.0 million D-
Mark, respectively, but exceed the reservation 
levels. Table 9 shows the situation where the 
reservation level for deposition in Belgium is set 
equal to 1 gram. 
Table 8 
As noted before, Belgium has difficulties 
achieving such a deposition level without help 
from other countries. This is shown by its very 
high domestic abatement costs, equal to the nadir 
value (809.2 million D-Mark). The Netherlands, 
on the other hand, helps Belgium by considerably 
reducing its emissions. The abatement costs to 
the Netherlands of 534.4 million D-Mark are 
quite high, and close to its nadir value of 536.0 
million D-Mark. A reasonable conclusion is that 
perhaps Belgium might consider transferring a 
limited amount of money, not exceeding the dif-
ferential effort by the Netherlands of 534.4 -
391.4 = 143.0 million D-Mark, if Belgium insists 
on limiting its depositions to 1 gram per square 
meter. On the other hand, the Netherlands bene-
fit from their domestic abatement as well, reach-
ing a deposition level of 0.53 grams as shown in 
Table 9, so that a transfer of close to 143 million 
D-Mark appears unreasonable. The extent of the 
monetary transfer (if any) might be decided in 
international negotiations. Finally, Table 10 shows 
the results of setting the reference values for both 
Belgium and the Netherlands equal to 1 gram. 
Since the Netherlands have no difficulty attaining 
Suggested solution for Belgium and the Netherlands, deposition reservation level in the Netherlands equal to one 
Country 
BEL 
NET 
Table 9 
Costs (million D-Mark) 
Aspiration Solution 
223.0 550.2 
139.1 391.4 
Depositions (grams/m'l 
Reservation Aspiration Solution 
445.9 1.86 1.62 
278.2 1.00 1.00 
Suggested solution for Belgium and the Netherlands, deposition reservation level in Belgium equal to one 
Country Costs (million D-Mark) Depositions (grams/ m 2 ) 
Aspiration Solution Reservation Aspiration Solution 
BEL 223.0 809.2 445.9 1.00 1.00 
NET 139.1 534.6 278.2 0.13 0.53 
Table IO 
Suggested solution for Belgium and the Netherlands, deposition reservation level for both equal to one 
Country Costs (million D-Mark) Depositions (grams/m2 ) 
Aspiration Solution Reservation Aspiration Solution 
BEL 223.0 809.2 445.9 1.00 1.00 
NET 139.1 521.6 278.2 1.00 0.54 
Reservation 
2.71 
1.00 
Reservation 
1.00 
2.03 
Reservation 
1.00 
1.00 
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a deposition level below 1 gram, it is not surpris-
ing that the solution in Table 10 is very similar to 
that in Table 9. 
7. Extensions 
The current model formulation can be ex-
tended in a number of ways. First, it is possible to 
focus on individual countries other than the ones 
selected in our illustration. Second, the model 
can easily be reformulated to consider blocks of 
countries with aggregate cost functions. Two such 
blocks which may be of interest are on the one 
hand the European Community, and on the other 
hand the COMECON countries. Game-theoretic 
aspects of the model dynamics can be explored as 
well. 
A straightforward extension of the current for-
mulation is to include nitrogen emissions in the 
model. and to consider Ph-levels rather than de-
positions due to S0 2 emissions only. Such a model 
would involve a dynamic problem formulation, as 
the Ph-levels of the soil depend in part on the 
Ph-levels in the previous year. A pilot version of 
such a model formulation is already available as a 
demonstration problem on the DIDAS-N diskette 
(Kreglewski et al. , 1988, pp. 38-41). This example 
problem is of limited size (2 regions and 3 years), 
and is a simplified version of the model formula-
tion by Hettelingh and Hordijk (1986). 
Another extension would be to utilize a finer 
grid of source-receptor linkages in the analysis. 
The analysis in our current paper is very rough, 
because only information on country-wide aver-
age depositions was used. A finer grid would 
enable studying the effects of pollution on differ-
ent ecosystems within a country, and would en-
able the policy maker to establish tighter limits 
on those ecosystems which are particularly sensi-
tive to pollution. It would also be of interest to 
investigate the computational limitations of the 
DIDAS-N system when finer grid models are 
analyzed. 
8. Final remarks 
In this paper, a multicriteria framework was 
proposed to analyze tradeoffs between deposition 
levels and abatement costs within and across 27 
European countries. Such a framework appears 
to have considerable advantages over previous 
single-objective approaches where total European 
costs are minimized given certain deposition tar-
gets, because the latter will likely call for unreal-
istically large transfers of money, whereas the 
multicriteria approach facilitates evaluating 
tradeoffs involving limited transfers between indi-
vidual or small groups of countries. The illustra-
tion clearly shows that it is possible to investigate 
numerous different scenarios where the criteria 
levels for various countries are restricted, using 
either 'hard ' constraints (upper bounds) or ' soft ' 
target values (aspiration and reservation levels). 
Rather than comprehensively analyzing policy and 
strategy issues, our purpose in the current paper 
was to emphasize these possibilities. The task of 
analyzing the pros and cons of different scenarios 
associated with the acid rain problem in Europe 
is a very complicated one. Our proposed method-
ology provides a useful decision support tool to 
aid policy makers in analyzing this problem. Of 
course our paper constitutes only a first attempt 
towards designing a true decision support frame-
work, and much work is yet to be done along the 
lines of the extensions mentioned above. 
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